Hi Jeremy, thanks for your work, I’ve followed and enjoyed it for a while.
“What they did on 10/7 left Israel with two options: Retaliation or no retaliation”
- to be clear, these are the military response options, and a false dichotomy.
It doesn’t mention the possible geopolitical concessions Israel could’ve made to e.g retract settlements from occupied areas, or reforming the Gaza checkpoint systems.
This article seems written in a way where the status quo before 10/7 was just, stable (and preferable). Also would’ve been great to announce your journalistic biases in the main text instead of in the footnote (as you often say that acknowledging bias is important).
Personal bias: not well informed about the conflict or the situation in the Middle East compared to I’m sure what you and others are. I’ll acknowledge that freely, but that I think my point still stands even with limited information.
Hey there! I appreciate all criticisms. I don't quite agree with all of them here, but I quite sincerely thank/applaud you for voicing them all the same! I always welcome those who engage in good faith. :)
Taking your points in turn:
1. To not respond militarily is de facto "no retaliation". As all the available polling emphasizes, this was just not a politically tenable option in Israel. (Perhaps one might wish for a different theoretical electorate. But we have the one we have, their response was fully predictable, and Hamas was trivially able to factor this in. And I'm also skeptical that any country's leadership could respond to a 10/7 in a dove-ish way and remain in power. When the security risk is that severe, a grieving and terrified public is going to want those risks addressed ASAP. And when you can't trust your counterparty, the "safe" solution there is attack. While that's morally unsatisfying, some actions really do just unlock a narrow set of options that are collectively tragic.)
2. To expect Israel to both not retaliate *and* also offer concessions is even less politically feasible. (Again, not a moral judgment. Just a statement about political realities. Netanyahu and his coalition were not elected by bases that would approve of such a decision en masse.)
3. There's a latent assumption here that concessions would appease Hamas and therefore solve the security risk as some alternative to military action. This does not map to anything that I've ever heard voiced by Hamas's leadership. Their articulated motivations for the attack were primarily about prisoner returns, alleged desecrations of the Al Aqsa mosque (hence the name of their 10/7 operation), and "returning to the project of establishing a state". But note that this last phrase isn't a reference to returning to eg Taba negotiations. They've been clear over the years about this. See eg this breakdown of their most recent charter revision (https://digitalprojects.palestine-studies.org/jps/fulltext/214551). They want a Palestinian state, but very explicitly only as a springboard to their foundational claim that all of the area, from river to sea, is exclusively their own. (To be clear, this isn't to say that this is what Palestinians more broadly want. I'm speaking narrowly of Hamas.)
4. Inflicting terrorism across the border at nearby kibbutzim is...not a reasonable prelude to asking for a more open checkpoint system1 No country in the world would take this risk.
5. I do agree that expanded settlements in the WB (Israel has had none in Gaza since 2005) have aggravated the situation. I'll get into that more in a future piece. But it's worth noting in preview that it's not as simple as "remove them all and you get peace". Removing at least *many* of them is certainly a precondition for peace (more or less every past negotiation has acknowledged this). But Hamas using terror attacks to make their point is only going to make Israel more cautious about relinquishing settlements in areas of the WB that they deem vital to their long-term security. So in a realist sense 10/7 made de-settlement trickier, even if we believe that Israel's WB settlement policy has been provocative and net negative.
6. The status quo in Gaza was certainly not particularly good. But it was very much on a pathway to improvement (more on this in the coming infrastructure piece). As just one point here, Israel had cleared the way for Gazan energy independence (at much higher levels of supply than Gaza has at present). Should more have been done faster? Imo definitely. But the trajectory was heading to a better place. Work permits were increasing, aid trucks were flowing, Egypt was being reasonably cooperative in Rafah. Nothing was great. But improvement is improvement. And to put it flatly, massacring civilians (including mostly-progressive kibbutz folks) in their homes is not a credible solution to speeding this process up. Hamas knew this. While those of a certain persuasion argue that 10/7 was an understandable expression of long-boiling rage and grievance, I'm aware of no argument that 10/7 was consistent with a serious attempt at improving the lives of average Gazans. It made everything much, much worse for them, and expecting any other outcome defies everything we know about political history.
7. I do think acknowledging biases is important! I put the longform version in a footnote just for space and flow reasons. Though I take your point that readers had to click down or scroll to read it. I'm of two minds about it. If it cleanly in the main text I think it was better placed there (that's where I usually put it). But it didn't fit, and imo clearly indicating "if you want to know, click here" is sufficient--if not wholly ideal--for the purpose. (Also worth noting that this would be different if my biases were different! If I put in the footnotes eg. "yeah I'm totes Team Israel all the way", that's unfair to not put in the main text. But my position is just "imo Taba represented the best solution to an otherwise insoluble conflict; that's not satisfying but it is what it is". This is a very moderate position! True it denies a maximalist Palestine / the elimination of a Jewish state in Israel. But fair or unfair, just or unjust, that hasn't been in the cards since 1948.)
Thanks for the very detailed reply (and ditto to you, thank you for engaging)! I'm sorry I missed it, for some reason I only got an email notification of your "like".
1 & 2: Rereading the article, I understand now that "Israel had two options" referred to the Israel = "Netanyahu government" - to which your comment makes sense (they have to do what the people want).
3. Understood about Hamas, makes sense too.
4 (and second halves of both 5 and 6). This in my mind is kind of the opposite direction of the Israel (mis)attribution I mention in 1), but I'm still trying to figure it out - let me explain what I'm thinking:
"Inflicting terrorism won't get closer to peace" (4); "the attack was reasonably expected to cause much more suffering in retaliation" (6b); "Hamas de facto sacrificed a great number of their own civilians" (II in article):
These (paraphrased, reduced) points treat Hamas as a rational entity, and Israel's retaliation as an inevitable (dispassionate) force of nature. The reason this grates at me a bit is it sounds a bit like a common misdirection from unjust systems to focusing on individuals that perpetrate actions.
In my understanding of (some) political history, with national independence movements or the civil rights movements, there were cases where there was an unjust system and people took drastic action (incl terrorism) to protest the system, and a common counter was to say "well now they just made the situation worse for everyone! The [powers] will crack down and people will be worse off", without examining the unjust system at the start. An example closer to my understanding is the narrative around protest / terrorism during apartheid South Africa (where Nelson Mandela was seen as a terrorist at the time). It's imperative to analyse the power dynamics and the system.
Perhaps as a counter-example, one could say "well Israel rationally expected that settling in WB and being adversarial towards Palestine as a whole would stoke civil unrest -> they brought this upon themselves" - I strongly disagree with this framing promoted in some circles, but it feels like the same sort of attribution error.
^With both of these examples I strongly condemn Hamas's terrorist attacks (and want to be clear on that), but I wouldn't go so far as to say that they bear the responsibility for the massive civilian casualties as a result.
I hope that kind of makes sense about the framing of the actors on both sides - if it doesn't, don't feel obliged to reply, I realise it's not really that well articulated anyway..
I guess from my filter bubble I'm mostly seeing coverage of the ongoing horrific attacks on civilians in Gaza, and was upset at a possible hint that it was "deserved"/"expected" (as I was when I saw people saying "Israel deserved/expected it") - but I hope you'll address this in article 2 on "casualty minimization" and humanitarian law.
I'm looking forward to the next articles :) I don't think I'll have anything to say in the next ones because the real moral/framing issues are bound to be in this initial article (which is just to say, don't worry about me badgering on every post from now on :) ).
This is already incredible work. Can't wait to read the rest. Thank you.
Hi Jeremy, thanks for your work, I’ve followed and enjoyed it for a while.
“What they did on 10/7 left Israel with two options: Retaliation or no retaliation”
- to be clear, these are the military response options, and a false dichotomy.
It doesn’t mention the possible geopolitical concessions Israel could’ve made to e.g retract settlements from occupied areas, or reforming the Gaza checkpoint systems.
This article seems written in a way where the status quo before 10/7 was just, stable (and preferable). Also would’ve been great to announce your journalistic biases in the main text instead of in the footnote (as you often say that acknowledging bias is important).
Personal bias: not well informed about the conflict or the situation in the Middle East compared to I’m sure what you and others are. I’ll acknowledge that freely, but that I think my point still stands even with limited information.
Thanks!
Hey there! I appreciate all criticisms. I don't quite agree with all of them here, but I quite sincerely thank/applaud you for voicing them all the same! I always welcome those who engage in good faith. :)
Taking your points in turn:
1. To not respond militarily is de facto "no retaliation". As all the available polling emphasizes, this was just not a politically tenable option in Israel. (Perhaps one might wish for a different theoretical electorate. But we have the one we have, their response was fully predictable, and Hamas was trivially able to factor this in. And I'm also skeptical that any country's leadership could respond to a 10/7 in a dove-ish way and remain in power. When the security risk is that severe, a grieving and terrified public is going to want those risks addressed ASAP. And when you can't trust your counterparty, the "safe" solution there is attack. While that's morally unsatisfying, some actions really do just unlock a narrow set of options that are collectively tragic.)
2. To expect Israel to both not retaliate *and* also offer concessions is even less politically feasible. (Again, not a moral judgment. Just a statement about political realities. Netanyahu and his coalition were not elected by bases that would approve of such a decision en masse.)
3. There's a latent assumption here that concessions would appease Hamas and therefore solve the security risk as some alternative to military action. This does not map to anything that I've ever heard voiced by Hamas's leadership. Their articulated motivations for the attack were primarily about prisoner returns, alleged desecrations of the Al Aqsa mosque (hence the name of their 10/7 operation), and "returning to the project of establishing a state". But note that this last phrase isn't a reference to returning to eg Taba negotiations. They've been clear over the years about this. See eg this breakdown of their most recent charter revision (https://digitalprojects.palestine-studies.org/jps/fulltext/214551). They want a Palestinian state, but very explicitly only as a springboard to their foundational claim that all of the area, from river to sea, is exclusively their own. (To be clear, this isn't to say that this is what Palestinians more broadly want. I'm speaking narrowly of Hamas.)
4. Inflicting terrorism across the border at nearby kibbutzim is...not a reasonable prelude to asking for a more open checkpoint system1 No country in the world would take this risk.
5. I do agree that expanded settlements in the WB (Israel has had none in Gaza since 2005) have aggravated the situation. I'll get into that more in a future piece. But it's worth noting in preview that it's not as simple as "remove them all and you get peace". Removing at least *many* of them is certainly a precondition for peace (more or less every past negotiation has acknowledged this). But Hamas using terror attacks to make their point is only going to make Israel more cautious about relinquishing settlements in areas of the WB that they deem vital to their long-term security. So in a realist sense 10/7 made de-settlement trickier, even if we believe that Israel's WB settlement policy has been provocative and net negative.
6. The status quo in Gaza was certainly not particularly good. But it was very much on a pathway to improvement (more on this in the coming infrastructure piece). As just one point here, Israel had cleared the way for Gazan energy independence (at much higher levels of supply than Gaza has at present). Should more have been done faster? Imo definitely. But the trajectory was heading to a better place. Work permits were increasing, aid trucks were flowing, Egypt was being reasonably cooperative in Rafah. Nothing was great. But improvement is improvement. And to put it flatly, massacring civilians (including mostly-progressive kibbutz folks) in their homes is not a credible solution to speeding this process up. Hamas knew this. While those of a certain persuasion argue that 10/7 was an understandable expression of long-boiling rage and grievance, I'm aware of no argument that 10/7 was consistent with a serious attempt at improving the lives of average Gazans. It made everything much, much worse for them, and expecting any other outcome defies everything we know about political history.
7. I do think acknowledging biases is important! I put the longform version in a footnote just for space and flow reasons. Though I take your point that readers had to click down or scroll to read it. I'm of two minds about it. If it cleanly in the main text I think it was better placed there (that's where I usually put it). But it didn't fit, and imo clearly indicating "if you want to know, click here" is sufficient--if not wholly ideal--for the purpose. (Also worth noting that this would be different if my biases were different! If I put in the footnotes eg. "yeah I'm totes Team Israel all the way", that's unfair to not put in the main text. But my position is just "imo Taba represented the best solution to an otherwise insoluble conflict; that's not satisfying but it is what it is". This is a very moderate position! True it denies a maximalist Palestine / the elimination of a Jewish state in Israel. But fair or unfair, just or unjust, that hasn't been in the cards since 1948.)
Thanks for the very detailed reply (and ditto to you, thank you for engaging)! I'm sorry I missed it, for some reason I only got an email notification of your "like".
1 & 2: Rereading the article, I understand now that "Israel had two options" referred to the Israel = "Netanyahu government" - to which your comment makes sense (they have to do what the people want).
3. Understood about Hamas, makes sense too.
4 (and second halves of both 5 and 6). This in my mind is kind of the opposite direction of the Israel (mis)attribution I mention in 1), but I'm still trying to figure it out - let me explain what I'm thinking:
"Inflicting terrorism won't get closer to peace" (4); "the attack was reasonably expected to cause much more suffering in retaliation" (6b); "Hamas de facto sacrificed a great number of their own civilians" (II in article):
These (paraphrased, reduced) points treat Hamas as a rational entity, and Israel's retaliation as an inevitable (dispassionate) force of nature. The reason this grates at me a bit is it sounds a bit like a common misdirection from unjust systems to focusing on individuals that perpetrate actions.
In my understanding of (some) political history, with national independence movements or the civil rights movements, there were cases where there was an unjust system and people took drastic action (incl terrorism) to protest the system, and a common counter was to say "well now they just made the situation worse for everyone! The [powers] will crack down and people will be worse off", without examining the unjust system at the start. An example closer to my understanding is the narrative around protest / terrorism during apartheid South Africa (where Nelson Mandela was seen as a terrorist at the time). It's imperative to analyse the power dynamics and the system.
Perhaps as a counter-example, one could say "well Israel rationally expected that settling in WB and being adversarial towards Palestine as a whole would stoke civil unrest -> they brought this upon themselves" - I strongly disagree with this framing promoted in some circles, but it feels like the same sort of attribution error.
^With both of these examples I strongly condemn Hamas's terrorist attacks (and want to be clear on that), but I wouldn't go so far as to say that they bear the responsibility for the massive civilian casualties as a result.
I hope that kind of makes sense about the framing of the actors on both sides - if it doesn't, don't feel obliged to reply, I realise it's not really that well articulated anyway..
I guess from my filter bubble I'm mostly seeing coverage of the ongoing horrific attacks on civilians in Gaza, and was upset at a possible hint that it was "deserved"/"expected" (as I was when I saw people saying "Israel deserved/expected it") - but I hope you'll address this in article 2 on "casualty minimization" and humanitarian law.
I'm looking forward to the next articles :) I don't think I'll have anything to say in the next ones because the real moral/framing issues are bound to be in this initial article (which is just to say, don't worry about me badgering on every post from now on :) ).
Brilliantly set out and an enjoyable read as I've had the same questions mostly. Really looking forward to the rest!
Appreciate that Dom! Was a pleasure chatting. Hope the rest of your trip is lovely.